It is commonly believed that consumers make frequent mistakes when subscribing to telephone calling plans. The fact that consumers show a strong preference for flat rate options has been frequently interpreted as evidence of irrational behavior. Such a choice is generally thought not to be cost minimizing ex-post. My results, obtained using data from the 1986 Kentucky tariff experiment, contradict these views and provide strong evidence in favor of the rationality of consumers' choices. I find that expectations regarding future consumption play an important role in the choice of calling plan. But more importantly, the evidence shows that there exist important learning effects that induce consumers to switch plans. Switching occurs in order to minimize the magnitude of monthly bills even in the short term and in response to very small differences in cost. JEL: D42, D82, L96.
Introduction
When a firm offers several tariff options to its customers, the possibility arises that they will make an ex-post mistake in tariff choice. This occurs since consumers cannot commit to a certain purchase level at the time they subscribe to the service option, and thus, they might find out later that a different choice of tariff could have resulted in a lower payment for their actual level of consumption. This is a common feature of increasingly important subscriptions markets, in which buyers and sellers maintain long term, non-anonymous relations and where learning induces interesting dynamics. On the one hand, buyers may learn their taste over time, thus making the right choice as times goes by; on the other hand, the seller may design options to identify the "type" of each buyer and, if possible, to extract a higher proportion of their consumer surplus by offering tariff options that are better tailored to the profile of the consumer. This paper focuses on the first type of learning. In turn I document buyer behavior in a subscriptions market using data from a tariff experiment run by South Central Bell (SCB) in Kentucky during the second half of
1986.
The most frequently studied case of subscriptions markets is the choice among Optional Calling Plans (OCPs) in the telephone industry. This paper shows that, contrary to the conventional wisdom among field experts and some recent contributions by behavioral economists, customers of local telephone service make, on average, the right tariff choice conditional on their actual realized consumption. I show that individual expectations on future telephone usage play a critical role in the subscription decision. Furthermore, I show that the behavior of local telephone customers is not characterized by a biased taste for a flat tariff option. Most consumers that subscribe to such an option are high use consumers, with correspondingly high expectations about future local telephone use.
For these consumers subscribing to the flat tariff option is both ex-ante and ex-post optimal. Finally, I show that consumers often switch tariff options with the explicit goal of minimizing the cost of their service, and they do so in the short term and in response to small differences in billing cost.
Most economists, perhaps with the exception of behavioral economists, view the possibility of ex-post mistakes as a transitory aspect of a dynamic process in which customers eventually learn what is the least expensive option for their demand profile. Surprisingly, many economists and field experts argue that there are important "particularities" in these markets that make them an exception to the principle of rationality.
Some of the suggested "particularities" include uncertainty about future consumption and rates; monthly variation in individual usage; explicit preferences for flat tariffs; and more importantly, persistent misperception of actual consumption [Mitchell and Vogelsang (1991, §8.2.2) and Taylor (1994, §7.1)]. Subscription markets include local telephone, long distance, wireless, electricity, cable, internet, and others. It is disturbing that we have to conclude that frequent decisions made by millions of customers in these markets are "anomalies" that cannot be explained by common economic principles. A first question to answer is, do they really make so many mistakes?
I use individual level data from SCB's 1986 local telephone tariff experiment, which was conducted in two cities in Kentucky. I focus on Louisville where customers were given a choice among tariff options. The evidence reported in this paper contradicts most common interpretations of the tariff choice puzzle in telecommunications. In particular, it shows that the choice among OCPs is not an exception to the theory of rational choice.
The evidence substantiates not only the argument that preferences for a flat tariff are the result of rational behavior by usage intensive consumers, but also that among consumers who made the incorrect choice, those who chose the optional measured service generated most of the additional revenues from the introduction of optional tariffs. The paper also documents for the first time that consumers respond to small cost differences between options and, as a result, switch services to minimize their monthly bill.
The econometric analysis in this paper benefits from the richness of the data set.
First, these data contain a partial indicator of consumers' own usage expectations. Thus, I can explicitly analyze the role of expectations in the choice among tariff options. Second, the data include individual usage information for a three month period previous to the tariff experiment, when all customers subscribed to the mandatory flat tariff. Therefore, telephone usage is not price sensitive over that period, which allows me to obtain individual forecasts of the maximum potential savings from switching to the measured service when the option became available. Thus, I can also study the role of potential savings on the decision to subscribe to a particular tariff option.
Within the telecommunications literature it is commonly argued that the small difference in cost between each alternative justifies careless behavior by consumers regarding the choice of optional tariff. 1 It may appear, then, that the interest in the study of OCPs can be confined to telecommunications pricing. However, this question opens a much broader discussion that exceeds the limits of telecommunication pricing. Should we ignore rational choice theory when the price difference between alternatives is small? How large does the price difference need to be to justify the use of rational choice theory?
Taking into account computation costs might help explain why consumers make systematic choice mistakes. Even rational consumers facing numerous and complex tariffs might not find it optimal to evaluate all options in detail. This rational behavior could lead to the result that consumers do not choose the option that minimizes costs. Fortunately high computation costs can be ruled out in the present study as consumers must choose between only two options, one of which is a flat tariff. The flat tariff consists of a fixed monthly payment for unlimited and non-metered local telephone use. The measured option includes elements of peak-load pricing, offering discounts depending on the time of use (peak vs. off-peak), in addition to a monthly allowance of calls for a monthly fee, i.e., use is not measured until it exceeds some threshold. Therefore, marginal consumers only need compare the fixed monthly fees of each tariff option, something that is easily observable by consumers. This minimizes any objection to the conclusions based on potential complexity in evaluating tariff options.
I also rule out the argument that risk aversion plays a role in tariff choice on the basis that the ex-post loss from making the wrong choice is on average only about $4.88 out of a representative $1,600 per capita monthly income (1986 dollars). The difference in cost between each alternative may appear insignificant. The evidence reported in this paper shows that consumers respond in the very short term to small cost differences by 1 See for instance Clay, Sibley, and Srinagesh (1992) and Srinagesh (1992) .
choosing the cost minimizing tariff option for their usage profile. Furthermore, I also find evidence that they switch options to achieve this goal, in particular by changing from the measured service back to the flat tariff. This provides very strong evidence that telephone customers behave rationally, and therefore, by extension, it supports the applicability of rational choice theory even in cases where differences in the cost of alternatives are small.
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As was previously mentioned, some economists have documented that consumers make frequent mistakes choosing between tariff options. They have concluded that the fact that most customers prefer a flat tariff option whenever it is available supports the idea that they are irrational, regardless of whether these mistakes are just a transitory feature associated with learning. This is the argument, for instance, of MacKie-Mason and Lawson (1993) , who use the same data set as the present study. Many studies in telecommunications examining choice among tariff options make use of the Subscriber Line Usage Survey (SLUS) collected at the time when optional local measured service was introduced. Using this data, Hobson and Spady (1988) and Kling and van der Ploeg (1988) report that a majority of customers in Michigan appear to show a bias towards subscribing to a flat tariff option. Kridel, Lehman, and Weisman (1993) document that one third of customers in Arkansas and Missouri who subscribe to a flat tariff option do not generate enough use to justify their subscription. Although the use information of these studies is comprised of long panels and numerous consumers, the demographic information included in SLUS is not rich. This dramatically reduces the number of useful observations and thus brings into question the validity of the results. However, using a longer panel that does not suffer from such sample selection constraints, Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) also argued that telephone customers switch tariff options less frequently than would be expected from a pure cost minimization perspective. In order to help decide whether the introduction of optional measured service should be approved, the KPSC asked SCB to conduct a tariff experiment in two Kentucky cities (Bowling Green and Louisville) during the second half of 1986. The tariff experiment affected the whole population of these two local exchanges, but in addition SCB conducted a telephone survey during the spring of 1986 to collect socioeconomic and demographic data on about five thousand households among the customers included in the experiment.
SCB also recorded the local monthly telephone use information of those households for March, April, and May before the start of the experiment. This data collection was very detailed and included the total number of calls and minutes of conversation by time of day, day of week, and distance bands within the local exchange as defined by the tariffs that would later be introduced at the beginning of July.
I will focus on the Louisville sample. While customers in Louisville paid $18.70 for monthly access and non-measured calls in the first half of 1986, during the second half of the year they had the choice of keeping the same flat tariff scheme or switching to measured service. The measured option included a $14.02 monthly fee and distinguished between peak, shoulder, and off-peak time bands, as well as two distance bands from the caller's location within the local exchange area. In distance band "A", the setup and duration prices were equal: 2 cents during peak, 1.3 cents during shoulder, and 0.8 cents during off-peak time. Setup charges were the same for distance band "B", but duration charges were doubled. Peak time included weekdays from 8 p.m. to 5 p.m., shoulder between 5 p.m. and 11 p.m. on weekdays and Sundays, while any other time was considered off-peak.
After a three month period of adjustment, SCB collected monthly individual telephone use information as well as actual tariff choices in October, November, and December.
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There is evidence of choice biased sampling that needs to be adjusted at the empirical stage. There is a clear disproportion between the percentage of customers that chose the measured service in the sample, 30 percent, and the proportion that chose the measured service in the population, only 10 percent. SCB selected the sample during the spring of 1986, before the introduction of tariff options. Thus, the divergence can only be explained by SCB having targeted a particular group of customers that, based on its previous knowledge of their calling profiles, were more likely to later choose the measured option, as they actually did. This sampling strategy served the interest of SCB, which could argue in favor of the optional measured rate on the basis of its widespread acceptance.
Observations on non-active customers (those who did not make a single phone call in any of the spring or fall months) and households that did not report all relevant information were excluded. This omission does not produce biased results as few households were excluded and those that were are balanced conditional on demographics. Around 14 percent of households did not report their income. In these cases I assigned an estimated average annual income level of $19,851 and included a dummy variable to index these cases.
4 Table 1 describes all variables and presents basic descriptive statistics for the sample.
It is remarkable that in addition to demographic data, SCB also asked consumers about the average number of telephone calls that they made during a week. This information was collected during the spring months of 1986, when the marginal tariff was zero for all customers (as it had always been in the past). Thus, the reported expected number of weekly calls can be interpreted as consumers' own estimates of their usage satiation level free of any price effect.
5 Table 1 shows that there are no major differences between demographics conditional on tariff choice, perhaps with the exception of households with teenagers and/or those that receive benefits. Households with these characteristics are most likely to subscribe to the flat tariff option. It is more likely to find households where the head holds a college degree among those that subscribe to the measured option. Table 1 
where Y i = 1 when household i subscribes to the optional measured service in October, and zero otherwise. Equation (1) is not included in the survey. Since SCB explicitly requested customers' own estimates of the average number of weekly calls, this information, available for most households in the sample, can be later compared with the actual number of weekly phone calls for every month in the study. When restricted to the spring sample, these two measures are free of any price or selection effect, and thus they provide good indicators of the actual and expected satiation levels θ 0 and θ 1 , respectively. The polynomial P (·) also includes two more indicators, LOW-EXPCALLS and HIGH-EXPCALLS, to identify individuals at the tails of the distribution of expectations.
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I estimate three nested specifications of the model given in equation (1). Table 2 reports probit estimates of the probability a consumer subscribes to the measured tariff option in October. 8 The first column of Table 2 The second column of Table 2 includes demographics so as to account for observable household heterogeneity. Households with different demographics may show distinctive local telephone use patterns that makes them more prone to subscribe to one tariff option over the other. 9 Households with higher than average incomes tend to subscribe to the optional measured service, a relationship that is decreasing in income. 10 Large households are more likely to subscribe to the flat tariff option while those with a head that holds a college degree are more likely to subscribe to the optional measured service.
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As before, the second column of Table 2 also includes indicators of expected demand.
Observe that the negative effect of actual consumption on the probability of subscribing to the measured option is robust to the existence of individual heterogeneity as accounted for by the available demographics. Again, conditional on demographics, usage intensive consumers are more likely to subscribe to the flat tariff while consumers with low expectations of future use tend to subscribe to the measured service. This confirms that 9 Consumers may also account for expectations along other consumption dimensions such as the distribution of the average duration of their calls, the time of the call, and the distance of the call destination within the local exchange. Although individual data is available for actual use along all these dimensions, individual expectations were only collected on the number of weekly calls. Alternatively, we can think of demographics as accounting for the effect of expectations along these additional dimensions.
10 This is the right choice for these customers, because high income households generally consume less than the average customer. High income levels and small household sizes characterize those customers with low demand for local telephone service. See the results of Hobson and Spady (1988) , Kling and Van Der Ploeg (1990) , as well as Miravete (2002) .
11 As I explained before, the sample is choice biased. The likelihood function needs to be modified to correct the proportion of consumers choosing each option so that the results are representative of the population. The t-statistics of Tables 2 and 3 are obtained from a sample-weighted covariance matrix as suggested by Manski and Lerman (1977) . Finally, the last column of Table 2 includes the potential savings that consumers would realize if instead of the mandatory flat tariff they were subscribed to a measured service in the spring while keeping their usage pattern unaltered. The significant positive sign of the estimate of SAVINGS in the last column of Table 2 indicates that, on average, consumers tend to subscribe to the least expensive tariff for their usage pattern. This is a key result that contradicts the common opinion that consumers systematically choose the wrong tariff option for their usage. Therefore on average, consumers minimize the cost of local telephone service when they choose tariff options. The next task is to study whether customers who eventually subscribed to the wrong option given their usage pattern are more likely to make persistent choice mistakes by renewing their subscription to the same tariff option or, alternatively, switch tariff plans. This is the objective of the following section.
Cost Minimization and Wrong Tariff Choice
The goal of this section is to study whether the choice of tariff was driven by an explicit attempt to minimize the monthly cost of local telephone service. The evidence presented in this section shows that the desire to reduce the cost of local telephone service does indeed help to explain tariff choice, thus ruling out the idea that consumers have an unjustifiably biased taste for flat tariffs. Actually, subscribers to the optional measured service tend to make more mistakes than those within the flat tariff option, but they also rapidly switch to the flat tariff. Table 3 presents the results from an analysis similar to the tariff choice of Section 3, but centered now on the decision to switch tariffs between October and December of 1986. Observe that among demographics it does not appear that any particular group of customers is more likely to switch tariff options. Only very large households appear to be more inclined to do so. Usage intensive consumers and those with very high expectations of future consumption are less likely to switch options. These customers are also more likely to subscribe to the flat tariff option as indicated in Table 2 . These results are in line with the common belief that most consumers subscribe to the flat tariff option for the long run. Combining the estimates of Table 2 
The Role of Savings in the Choice of Tariff
Depending on the actual volume of telephone use, consumers can be classified ex-post as having chosen correctly or incorrectly each tariff option. This classification is made contingent on keeping the same usage pattern independent of price responses, which provides an approximate upper bound on the gains of switching to a different tariff option. Consumers who chose the flat option (90 percent of the population in the Louisville exchange) were 12 It should be noticed again that the SAVINGS indicator refers to potential savings in the spring. This is done to ensure that this regressor is exogenous. Including potential savings for October would add serious endogeneity as well as state dependence problems that would complicate the estimation process and compromise the robustness of the estimates. While on average consumers underestimate their future use (see Table 1 A previously advanced potential explanation is that it is easier for consumers who are subscribed to the measured service to monitor the cost of their current use than for those who are subscribed to the flat tariff option. This is confirmed by the descriptive statistics in Table 4 . Observe that in October, more than a half of FM-customers correctly subscribed to the flat tariff option. Only 11 percent of FF-customers had a significantly low use to justify switching tariff options, but 44 percent of FM-customers could realize savings beyond the fixed monthly fees of these tariffs. These facts argue in favor of the argument that current potential savings (not the exogenous spring time indicators of Table   2 ) may influence the decision to switch tariffs. However, the percentage of FM-customers choosing the wrong tariff increased from 44 percent in October to 65 percent in December after subscribing to the measured service. Notwithstanding, in both cases, the magnitude of potential savings is very low, indeed smaller than the fixed $3.74 monthly cost difference between tariff options. It is possible that FM-customers may have been guided by an explicit attempt to reduce their monthly cost of local telephone service. Unfortunately, the evidence is not conclusive, partly because only three months of observations are available and the last one, December, is characterized by a general increase in demand. This seasonality effect may imply that the mistakes of FM-customers are just transitory.
The remaining set of households, those who switch from measured to flat tariff service between October and December (MF-customers), provide us with the most compelling evidence that consumers switch tariffs in an explicit attempt to minimize the cost of local telephone service. All these customers clearly made the wrong decision of subscribing to the measured tariff in October. These are intensive users. Their actual consumption in the spring exceeded the average use of FF-customers, but contrary to FF-customers, they on average underestimated their future use. Their low expectations explain their initial choice of measured service, but when they realized that the cost of their local telephone use exceeded $18.70 they switched back to the flat tariff option. In October, they faced an average potential savings of $17 if they switched back to the flat tariff. Almost all MF-customers, 98 percent, were intensive enough consumers to exceed the allowance of the measured tariff. These numbers remain quite stable in December (their usage pattern does not vary much over time), but by then these customers all subscribed to the flat tariff option, realizing an average savings of $16.33.
I thus conclude that the evidence reported above does not support the idea that a large proportion of customers systematically prefer flat rates independent of their telephone use. The realization of potential savings under the alternative tariff leads consumers to switch options in the very short term. This effect is clearer for customers that switch from measured to flat service than for those who make the opposite change.
Expectations and Wrong Tariff Choice
Although consumers appear to learn their calling profile and reduce their monthly payments by switching to their least expensive option, the panel is too short for them to reach a steady-state equilibrium. Evidently, wrong tariff choices are unavoidable given the nature of telephone demand (seasonality and unforeseen changes in demand) and the fact that consumers must first subscribe to a particular tariff option and then later decide their level of use.
It is not clear from Table 4 that whether potential inaccuracies in expectations are responsible for the wrong choice of tariffs. Those that end up with the flat tariff option may appear to be guessing correctly, since the percentage of wrong choices decreases over time. The opposite result holds for those who end up subscribing to the measured option.
But both results may also be explained by the increased use associated with the holiday season in December. In order to disentangle these effects, Table 5 reports the results from estimating a model very similar to that given in equation (1). In particular, I estimate different versions of:
where Z it = 1 when household i subscribes to a tariff choice that turns out to be more The results reported in this study reconcile commonly observed tariff choice patterns with the axiom of rationality of consumer behavior in two ways: static and dynamic. From a static point of view, when signing up for a particular tariff option, consumers are guided by their expectations of future telephone use rather than by some sort of pathology. In addition, from a dynamic perspective we not only care that consumers behave rationally when choosing tariff plans, but also that they learn after making an initial mistake in tariff choice and switch tariffs to minimize their monthly payments for local telephone service.
The evidence reported in this paper supports the rationality of consumers and refutes numerous previous interpretations of tariff choice patterns in telecommunication service markets.
There remains one last issue to be addressed in the future through structural analysis of this data: the majority of consumers predict a level of use that would place them above the allowance of the measured service option. We have seen that most of these consumers (86 percent 
